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Abstract
This paper replicates the computation of an aggregate indicator for
Slovene house prices, using a multiple indicator approach developed for
the Austrian house price data by Schneider (2013). The aim of the
aggregate misalignment indicator is therefore to recognize the under-
and over-valuation of house prices in Slovenia. The key findings are that
during the 2004-2008 economic boom period the aggregate misalignment
indicator clearly shows the significant over-valuation of Slovene house
prices, while during the financial crisis there was an abrupt correction
in house prices. With real house prices still declining despite recent
economic recovery there is currently an under-valuation of house prices
present, from the end of 2013 onwards.
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1 Introduction
The dynamics and development of house prices are treated as very important.
The dynamics of housing wealth can have a significant effect on aggregate
consumption and can consequently determine the business cycle of a particular
economy. In the boom periods it can act as a financial accelerator and can
cause more severe and prolonged crises after the burst. In addition to the
consumption effect, the housing wealth can also influence the credit worthiness
of firms and households and can also jeopardize the balance sheets of banks.
The housing wealth is most intuitively reflected in property prices, which
are in theory commonly considered thorough various types of discount models.
Accordingly, the price evaluating housing asset would thus resemble the net
present value of the future rental income, discounted by a risk-free interest rate.
The property prices are therefore determined by future expectations, which can
be affected by the current and expected future state of the economy. Sufficient
housing demand (driven by favourable interest rates, loan availability, house-
hold income, unemployment rate, and others) on one side and housing supply
(resembled in construction material prices, labour costs, building permits, and
others) on the other, may considerably affect the property prices, which in
turn affects the activity in construction sector and hence the overall economy.
The aim of this paper is to combine various demand and supply factors into
one indicator, indicating an alignment of property prices with the current and
expected future state of the economy.
Using a multiple indicator method (explained in the following chapters)
we try to assess an aggregate misalignment indicator based on 7 subindicators
in order to identify the under- and/or over-valuation of the house prices in
Slovenia. These 7 subindicators cover different house market areas. Three of
them are reflecting the household perspective in the housing market, three of
them are reflecting the investors’ perspective, while the last one covers the
banking system perspective. Compared to the actual market house prices,
our composite indicator can be interpreted as a house price indicator resem-
bling economic fundamentals. The main findings of the paper are that in the
2004-2008 economic heating-up period the aggregate misalignment indicator
suggests a significant over-valuation of Slovene house prices, while with the
start and during the economic and financial crisis period the Slovene house
prices abruptly decreased. In the 2011-2013 period the aggregate misalign-
ment indicator shows that the house prices were more or less aligned with the
fundamentals. However, due to economic recovery in Slovenia starting with
the end of 2013 and an ongoing fall in house prices, the aggregate misalignment
indicator suggests that the house prices are currently under-valued.
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2 The motivation and a short literature pre-
view
The last financial crisis had shown that large swings in real estate prices be-
came a relevant issue from the economic policy perspective. These swings may
cause financial and other macroeconomic instabilities. When house prices rise,
they can act as a financial accelerator in the build-up process of the imbalances
in the economy and can later cause more severe and prolonged crises after the
burst. The decrease in house prices is reflected in the form of financial losses of
credit institutions and investors holding real estate as an investment as well as
collateral and can have unwanted negative wealth effects for households. Due
to the negative equity effect and the consequent deleveraging process (Eg-
gertsson and Krugman, 2012), this usually leads to a sharp drop in aggregate
demand and could later on lead into a deflationary spiral.
Ex ante detecting price misalignments has always been difficult. From this
perspective the policy makers’ task is to identify the drivers of price misalign-
ments and apply necessary steps to curb these misalignments. The identi-
fication of the main drivers of the residential property price dynamics and
consequently the ability of a precise signalling of the future residential prop-
erty prices could therefore represent a corner stone in preventing house price
bubbles and the negative effects of their burst on a particular economy. Even
more, a reliable early warning signal could enable a timely response of the
economic policy by forming and implementing appropriate (micro- and macro-
prudential) tools, which could in turn (at least) limit the future house price
bubbles and strengthen the resilience of the financial sector.
Focusing the analysis to the case of Slovenia, in Figure 1, there is a visible
distinction of the development of the house price bubble in the Slovene housing
market till 2008. With the start of the global financial crisis the real house
prices significantly decreased. Comparing the real house prices with the real
GDP growth, one can clearly suspect there was an over-valuation of the house
prices in the 2004-2008 economic pre-crisis boom period in Slovenia. While
the real GDP growth slowly picked up in 2010 and in 2014, the real house
prices continue to fall till this day following an abrupt correction in 2008 and
2009 and a relative stable period in 2010 and 2011. However, the chart-based
inference of solely observing house price movements alone does not off us any
concluding suggestion about the presence of house bubble just yet.
5
Figure 1: Real house price dynamics and the real GDP growth in Slovenia
(Average 2010 = 100)
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS).
*Note: In order to compare the real GDP dynamics the nominal house prices are presented in real terms and are deflated
by the HICP inflation.
Despite the difficulties of a housing bubble identification1, the key question
how to identify the under- and/or over-valuation of the house prices remains.
Most of the present-value method literature focuses on calculating the funda-
mental house prices on the basis of economic fundamentals and then compares
them with actual market house prices. If the actual market house prices ex-
ceed the fundamental house prices, then the housing market is over-valued,
and vice versa. In order to calculate the fundamental house prices, researchers
use several methodologies. For example, by net present value methodology the
fundamental house prices are calculated on the basis of discounting future rent
returns and then comparing them to market house prices. Similarly to the net
present value method, the user cost methodology uses a comparison between
the ongoing housing expenditures2 of home-ownership and market rent returns.
Both methods are usually used by financial and investment professionals when
valuing their portfolio.
However, most of the academic literature focuses on the econometric-based
methodologies. Dreger and Kholodilin (2011) for instance constructed an early
warning system based on three alternative approaches (signalling approach,
logit and probit models) in order to signal the possible over-valuation in the
housing market. Quantile regression (McMillen, 2008; Zietz, Zietz and Sir-
1Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) argue that the house price dynamics are a local
phenomenon and that strong conclusions based on typical economic and housing variables
are not reliable and could be misleading.
2Which usually include the opportunity costs of the capital deployed, property taxes,
maintenance costs, appreciation/depreciation of the residence, a risk premium, etc.
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mans, 2008; Gerdesmeier, Lenarcˇicˇ and Roffia, 2012) is another method based
on fundamentals used to detect the boom and busts of the house prices. In
short, the quantile regression measures the effect of the predictor variables on a
specified quantile of the response variable, based on the modelling relationship
between a set of predictor variables and the response variable. Markov-switch
models (Schaller and van Noorden, 2002) try to capture the regime-switching
characteristics in market revenues by separating the price dynamics onto fads
or bubbles. Panel regressions (Kajuth, Knetsch and Pinkwart, 2013) and var-
ious types of autoregression models, such as the VECM3 models (Gattini and
Hiebert, 2010; Chen, Gan, Hu and Cohen, 2012) and more complex dynamic
macroeconomic models (for example: Darracq Paries and Notarpietro, 2008;
Iacoviello and Neri, 2010) were used as well; however the latter methods are
more suitable for forecasting purposes.
In order to take into consideration a larger number of relevant economic
variables influencing the housing market the multiple indicator methodol-
ogy was developed (UBS, 2012; Schneider, 2013), which tries to capture the
demand-side as well as the supply-side factors. The idea behind the multiple
indicator method is to incorporate factors such as the house price-to-CPI ratio,
price-to-income ratio, price-to-hypothetical borrowing volume, loan bearing
capacity, price-to-construction costs, real housing investments-to-GDP ratio
and price-to-rent ratio in order to take into account their characteristics which
could in turn affect the housing dynamics and development. In chapter 5 the
multiple indicator method is presented in more detail.
3 An overview of the Slovene housing market
This section offers a descriptive overview of the Slovene housing market in or-
der to assess whether our quantitative method can represent a relevant stance
of housing market developments. For the past 20 years Slovene housing market
has been characterized by a large home-ownership rates, enabled by Housing
Act in the early 90s. With more than 80% ownership share Slovenia is hold-
ing second place among euro area countries and in turn exhibiting one of the
least developed rental market. Only 12% of Ljubljana’s residential units were
considered to be of a rental nature in the pre-crisis period. The extremely un-
derdeveloped rental market and ownership structure indicate a critical shortage
of supply that has prevailed in Slovene real estate market for most of the pe-
riod since the independence. In order to tackle the under-supplied market,
the government issued the National Housing Programme act in 2000, which
in its implementation provisioned to reach 10.000 completions per annum by
the year 2009 (see Figure 2 for actual number of completions). The shortage
3the Vector Error Correction Model
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of supply may perhaps be best resembled in the Ljubljana Municipal Hous-
ing Fund data. In 15 years of fund’s existence it received more than 15.000
applications for non-profit rentals while only 1912 dwellings were allocated.
In that particular example the demand exceeded the number of dwellings by
843% (Sendi, 2010).
Figure 2: Number of completions - new dwellings
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS).
The investments into new dwellings only started to rise more steadily after
2004. In that period Slovene construction sector was abundant with foreign
labour force and extremely low construction costs, ranking behind Slovakia,
Romania, Poland and Bulgaria. Combination of soaring sales prices and very
affordable borrowing conditions enabled developers to generate high profits.
But the construction boom had been short lived. With the financial crisis
and credit crunch in particular, the pre-crisis profit expectations turned out
to be extremely unrealistic. The result of the housing bubble burst can be
summarized by a large number of stalled projects, bankruptcy of construc-
tion firms and lower employment, especially in the construction sector. Low
construction activity from and residential investments consequently decreased
the number of completions of new dwellings to the level a decade ago, again
emphasizing the shortage of supply of new dwellings reaching historical lows
in 2014.
Figure 3 illustrates the demand and supply side aspect from the perspective
of credit activity. In the third quarter of 2014, 150 million euros of mortgage
loans were issued to households, which is 57% lower compared to the peak value
in 2010. The construction sector has been granted 134 million euros of new
8
loans in 2014Q34. The highest borrowing activity in construction was recorded
at the end of 2009, when firms were already facing liquidity and solvency issues
and most credits were used to refinance and meet the existing liabilities.
Figure 3: New mortgages (left); New loans - construction (right)
Source: Banka Slovenije.
Dire situation in residential construction activity is visible in the real con-
struction activity index and gross investments into residential buildings. The
value of residential activity in Slovenia bottomed at the end of 2014. Namely,
in the last quarter of 2014, the construction activity index was on average 75%
lower compared to the average of 2010. A slightly more positive sign can be
given by observing business tendencies in construction sector, where the differ-
ence between positive and negative answers (on expected employment activity
and new orders) netted to 0 for the first time in the post-crisis period, albeit
due to increased public infrastructure investment. Annual growth of residen-
tial building investments and newly issued building permits remains negative
(Figure 4).
4Mostly due to government procurements.
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Figure 4: Residential construction activity index and business tendencies (left);
Building permits and gross residential investments (right)
Source: Banka Slovenije.
4 The subindicators
For the purpose of constructing our leading misalignment indicator we consider
7 subindicators representing the fundamentals by which a housing market is
directly driven. Our subindicators consists of 3 variables covering households’
perspective, 3 variables representing investors’ perspective, and one indicator
representing the system perspective. The subindicators included in aggrega-
tion of misalignment indicator were selected on the basis of the literature re-
viewed in the Section 2. Table 1 summarizes key housing market fundamentals
recognized by the literature reviewed for the purpose of this analysis.
Table 1: The fundamentals comparable and recognized by the literature
Household perspective Investor perspective System perspective
Price-to-CPI Price-to-income Hypothetical borrowing volume User costs Construction costs Price-to-rent Housing investments-to-GDP Loan bearing capacity Debt-to-income Interest rate risk
Schneider (2013) X X X X X X X
UBS (2013) X X X X X
ECB (2013) X X X X X
Gerdesmeier et al (2013) X X X
Gatini and Hiebert (2010) X X X
The data limitation of particular indicators limits our indicators selection
to the following choice: price-to-CPI ratio, price-to-income ratio, hypotheti-
cal borrowing volume, loan bearing capacity, price-to-construction costs ratio,
housing investments-to-GDP ratio, and price-to-rent ratio. All indicators in-
clude seasonally adjusted categories and spans the period from 2000Q1 to
2015Q2. The dynamics of each sub-indicator is depicted in the Figure 5.
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the index follows a hedonic method using log-linear regression function based
on transaction prices and set of explanatory variables including floor area of the
dwelling and its squared value, age of the dwelling and its squared value, tourist
attraction of the municipality area where the property is situated, and the gross
domestic product and its squared value corresponding to the statistical region
of the transacted property. The real index is obtained by deflating the nominal
property price index by the consumer price inflation (2010=100).
4.2 Price-to-income ratio
In order to get a better insight of the households’ purchasing power one needs
to consider the real residential property prices in relation to real household
income. As the measure of affordability of housing ownership we therefore
consider the price-to-income ratio. In the build-up to the financial crisis (2004-
2007) it can easily be observed that the growth of the residential prices signif-
icantly surpassed the household disposable income growth. The detachment
of the prices from the household income clearly offers an indication of the
evolution of the housing bubble in Slovenia. Namely, at the end of 2013 an in-
dividual would have to give up 67 average net salaries in order to acquire 50m2
flat, whereas at the peak of the residential price index this number amounted
approximately 107 average Slovenian net salaries. The price-to-income ratio
therefore relates the average real house price per m2 to real average Slovenian
net salary:
Price-to-income ratio =
Real average house price per m2
Real household disposable income
(1)
4.3 Price-to-hypothetical borrowing volume
Interpreting price-to-income ratio as the measure of housing affordability has
one important limitation, that is ignoring the importance of the interest rates
in purchasing the high-value assets. Namely, the interest rates crucially de-
termines the portion of the household income that can be dedicated to pay
mortgage instalment. In order to account for both, the disposable income and
the interest rates, we employ the affordability indicator proposed by Schneider
(2013) that relates the housing price to hypothetical volume of the loan that
an average household could borrow. To calculate the latter we assume that
a household will dedicate a fixed percentage of its income c ∗ Y for mortgage
payments for a loan with assumed repayment period of 20 years (T = 20):
K =
c ∗ Yt(
1−RT+1t
1−Rt
)
RTt
(2)
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Where K stands for the hypothetical borrowing volume, Rt is the gross
interest rate corresponding to the 1 plus the mean nominal interest rate on
mortgage loans, c is a constant, and Y is the average Slovenian net salary in
constant prices at time t. To assure the consistency between the sub-indicators
and to track the deviation of the house prices from the affordable income
and borrowing volume for households, we include the inverted affordability
indicator ((K/House prices)−1) in the calculation of the leading misalignment
indicator. In general the affordability indicator offered by Schneider (2013)
closely follows the dynamics of the price-to-income ratio with two notable
differences. The Schneider’s (2013) affordability obviously better captures the
high inflation period in the beginning of the sample which coincided with record
high interest rates. The second difference that can be observed is the prolonged
period of deteriorated affordability of housing purchase coinciding with severe
borrowing and financial conditions in the years of 2007 and 2008. In the case of
the price-to-income ratio, that ignores the interest rates an therefore financial
conditions, this not possible to notice as the affordability deterioration seems
to be far less persistent in the period following the peak of the house price
index.
4.4 Loan bearing capacity
From the perspective of the banking system and that somewhat relates to the
affordability indicators is the loan bearing capacity introduced by Schneider
(2013). It relates the households’ hypothetical borrowing volume to the actual
amount of mortgage loans granted to households by the Slovenian banks. On
the onset of the crisis in the second half of 2008 the indicator amounted to
only half of the value noted in the year 2004, indicating the built up exposure
of banks to a systemic risk and undesirable position of households to meet the
repayment obligations of the outstanding loans. The highest amounts of the
indicator coincides heavily with the low interest environment and cheap credit
activity of Slovenian banks in the years of 2004 and 2005, essentially contribut-
ing to the perceived better loan-servicing capacity and built-up of banks’ risky
assets related to that period. As with the others indicators, to track deviations
of from the fundamental housing markets we include the inverted loan bearing
capacity indicator in the calculation of the composite misalignment indicator.
4.5 Price-to-construction costs ratio (Tobin’s Q)
In order to measure the supply-side activity and its evolution we use a relation
between property prices and construction costs containing the construction
labour costs as well as construction material costs. The ratio is considered as
an important long-term supply-side cost factor. The relation can be interpreted
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as a resemblance to Tobin’s Q or company’s performance, i.e. market value-
to-replacement costs ratio. The exceeding critical value of 1 can be interpreted
as an over-valuation of a company’s stock, in our case an over-valuation of the
house prices in relation to construction costs. In the boom period, property
prices in Slovenia grew at a much faster pace than construction costs. Con-
sequently, the ratio of the two rose by around 40% in that period, peaking at
the value of 1.15 in the second quarter of 2007. During the financial crisis and
the housing bubble burst the price-to-construction costs ratio was faced by a
significant correction. Currently the ratio is returning to the levels from the
pre-boom era.
Tobin’s Q is calculated using the following relation:
Price-to-construction costs ratio =
Residential property price index
Construction costs index
(3)
4.6 Real housing investments-to-GDP ratio
The real housing investments-to-GDP ratio provides an additional supply-side
indicator. It proxies housing dynamics relative to GDP and reflects the infusion
of housing capital to support the housing development process. As GDP, real
housing investments move pro-cyclically, however are more susceptible to price
volatilities and market/sector vulnerabilities in comparison to GDP. Keeping in
mind these housing investments characteristics, the real housing investments-
to-GDP ratio could indicate boom and bust periods in the housing market.
A disproportionate high ratio of housing investments-to-GDP would therefore
imply a housing sector overheating, especially during the so-called pre-high-
cost boom years (Detken and Smets, 2004). As most sub-indicators housing
investment-to-GDP ratio also indicates a housing sector overheating during
the boom period, before the burst in 2008. However, in comparison to other
sub-indicators the housing investment-to-GDP ratio decreased from its highest
4.6% of GDP to record low 2.5% of GDP, which is significantly lower in the
pre-crisis period. These low figures reflect the construction sector breakdown
in Slovenia after the burst in the housing market.
For the purpose of constructing the real housing investments-to-GDP indi-
cator we use the following relation:
Real housing investments-to-GDP ratio =
Real housing investments
Real GDP
(4)
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4.7 Price-to-rent ratio
The price-to-rent ratio compares the costs of owning a property to renting it.
The larger the value of the price-to-rent ratio the better it is to buy property
in comparison to rent it. In the long term, the ratio should be stationary, since
rising relative prices for residential properties make renting a more attractive
option, in turn leading to reduced demand for home ownership. However, in
the second quarter of 2007 the price-to-rent ratio peaked indicating the most
significant overshooting of the real estate prices in comparison to the rental
market. At the end of 2013 the indicator decreased to values from the pre-
crisis period, reflecting the adjustments of the house prices after the crisis
period. Most of the deviations in the price-rent ratio is related to changes in
future returns and not to changes in rents (Krainer and Wei, 2004). This is
an important perspective since the price-to-rent ratio in Slovenia is returning
to its average level in the period between 2000 and 2005, and it will probably
continue to do so through downward house price adjustment.
It can be defined as:
PE =
Average price
Average rent
(5)
From the burst of the housing bubble in 2008 the price-to-rent ratio de-
creased significantly, while in the last couple of years the price-to-rent stabilised
somewhat, indicating a possible shift in falling house prices.
5 The multiple indicator method on the basis
of 7 subindicators
The 7 subindicators enter the aggregate (overall) misalignment indicator as
separate time series variables in the form of percentages of deviation from their
own historical average. In the calculation process of the overall misalignment
indicator the weighting factors have to be determined first. The subindicator
weighing follows Schneider’s (2013) method and is done by applying a prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) with which the cyclical co-movement of the
separate subindicators could be stressed.
Each of the 7 subindicators (xi,t) can be written down as a linear combi-
nation of (uncorrelated/orthogonal) factors:
xi,t = αi,1F1,t + αi,2F2,t + ...+ αi,jFj,t + εi (6)
15
where Fj,t is a principal component factor and αi,j represents the factor loading
of variable i on factor j. The first principal component factor has the largest
possible variance. Each succeeding component factor has again the highest
possible variance conditional on the orthogonal constraint to the preceding
component factors.
With the obtained principal component factors the aggregate misalignment
indicator can be derived, following the weighted sum of the 7 subindicators:
MIt =
I∑
i
wixi,t (7)
where the weights, wi, are calculated by normalising the sum of pre-weights,
vi, to 1. Pre-weights vi are calculated by multiplication of the squared factor
loading, αi,j, of variable i on factor j with the explained fraction of the dataset
variance φj by factor j:
vi = α
2
i,jφj (8)
The dataset variance φj is therefore defined as:
φj =
σ2j∑J
j=1 σ
2
j
(9)
where factor j represents the factor on which a particular variable i has the
largest loading, j = argmax(abs(α2i,j)).
The obtained aggregate misalignment indicator of housing prices is shown
in Figure 6. The misalignment indicator shows a clear over-valuation pattern
during the boom cycle, and reaches a 24% over-valuation in its peak at the end
of 2007. From the onset of the crisis the real house prices declined significantly
(and continue to decline) and with the steady picking-up of the economy in
recent quarters, there is an under-valuation present from the 2013 onwards
based on historical averages of the 7 subindicators.
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Figure 6: Misalignment indicator and the contributions of subindicators
Source: own calculations.
The findings of the dynamics of the under- and over-valuation periods in
the housing markets across other European countries are in-line with conclu-
sions made across most of the European countries in other papers (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2013; Schneider, 2013). The misalignment indicator of housing
prices for Slovenia suggests that the severity of the housing bubble was closer
to the case of countries such as Spain, Ireland, Belgium, United Kingdom
and Netherlands (Fradique Lourenc¸o and Rodrigues, 2014; Malzubris, 2008),
and was consequently more pronounced in comparison to other core European
countries where the identified over-valuations were around 5 to 10% in urban
housing markets. Since the housing market is more sensitive to the business
cycles and general economic conditions thus potentially amplifying the pro-
cyclicality, the understanding of drivers of house prices therefore represents
an important tool from the economic policy perspective in order to prevent
future misalignments in house prices and to recognize the build-ups of housing
bubbles. In this respect further prudential measures and instruments could
be developed with the intention of strengthening the resilience of the financial
sector against the house-price shocks and bubbles. On the other side pol-
icy measures should be taken in the case of under-valuation of house price
as well. Having said that, policy makers could stimulate the housing market
via buying/rental housing schemes (especially for low and moderate-income
homeowners and renters), housing tax relief and related schemes, renovation
schemes, and simplifying the construction and building permit procedures.
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Despite of its good informative nature it has to be noted that the misalign-
ment indicator may lack a robust reliability characteristic. In order to achieve
that, a longer and a more stable economic period (10-15 years) would have
to be considered. In the case of the Slovene real estate market this is cur-
rently impossible due to several reasons. In the 90’s the economy of Slovenia
was faced with the transition period, which was characterised by a shortage of
supply, undeveloped financial and investment markets and therefore an illiq-
uid and undeveloped real estate market. The supply shortage was evident till
the 2004 when the ”tranquil” period was disrupted by the 2004-2008 boom
period characterized by an abundance of credit and soaring construction sec-
tor. From the burst in 2008 the real estate market in Slovenia has not yet
fully recovered. The construction activity and residential investment are low
and the house prices have yet to stabilise. Further more, the methodology of
the misalignment indicator construction allows us to consider a larger number
of subindicators, however several subindicators had to be left out from the
analysis since their time series is too short.
6 Conclusions
By using Schneider’s (2013) multiple indicator methodology we try to identify
the under- and over-valuation of house prices in Slovenia. The key findings
are that during the 2004-2008 economic boom period the aggregate misalign-
ment indicator clearly shows the significant over-valuation of house prices in
Slovenia, while during the financial crisis there was an abrupt price correction
(following a similar pattern than in most European countries). Due to a steady
economic recovery in Slovenia starting at the end of 2013 and an ongoing fall
in house prices, the aggregate misalignment indicator suggests that the house
prices are currently under-valued, based on the 7 subindicators.
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